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Abstract
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) sets up routes between the smaller networks that make
up the Internet. Despite its crucial role, BGP is notoriously vulnerable to serious problems,
including (1) propagation of bogus routing information due to attacks or misconfigurations, and
(2) network instabilities in the form of persistent routing oscillations. The conditions required
to avoid BGP instabilities are quite delicate. How, then, can we explain the observed stability
of today’s Internet in the face of common configuration errors and attacks?
This work explains this phenomenon by first noticing that almost every observed attack
and misconfiguration to date shares a common characteristic: even when a router announces
egregiously bogus information, it will continue to announce the same bogus information for the
duration of its attack/misconfiguration. We call these the “fixed-route attacks”, and show that,
while even simple fixed-route attacks can destabilize a network, the commercial routing policies
used in today’s Internet prevent such attacks from creating instabilities.
1 Introduction
The Internet is composed of smaller networks, called Autonomous Systems (ASes) (e.g., AT&T,
Bank of America, Google, etc.). The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a distributed protocol
that allows ASes to learn to reach distant ASes via announcements from their neighboring ASes.
Each BGP announcement contains a list of every AS en route to a destination; each AS repeatedly
applies its local routing policy to select a single available route to each destination, and announces
that route to its neighbors. Despite it’s crucial role, BGP routing is notoriously vulnerable to a
number of serious problems:
Bogus routing information. Because the Internet currently lacks infrastructure to validate
the correctness of information in routing messages (e.g., does the route actually exist? is one
AS impersonating another), an AS can propagate false routing information through the Internet
and thus influence the routes selected by other ASes. We see this quite frequently in practice;
a typical cause is a configuration error, where a router is mistakenly programmed to announce a
bogus route [9,11], but we also worry about attacks where a router deliberately manipulates routing
information to draw traffic to its network (that it can tamper with, drop, or eavesdrop on) [2,10,12].
Instability. BGP allows ASes great expressiveness in configuring local routing policies. Unfortu-
nately, these routing policies can interact in ways that lead to persistent routing oscillations, i.e.,
situations where some ASes endlessly change the route they select, even when network structure
is static (in terms of network topology, ASes’ routing policies, etc.). BGP oscillations render the
∗This is the revised and expanded version of a paper that appeared as a brief announcement in PODC 2012 [8].
This project was supported by NSF Grant S-1017907.
1
network unpredictable and can significantly harm network performance, as every time a router
switches routes, it is bound to delay, misorder, or even drop, some fraction of the traffic it is
carrying) [6, 7].
On the bright side, we have never seen events in which bogus routing information has inadvertently
lead to a BGP instability. One might claim the attacks/misconfigurations we have seen in the wild
were never intended to create BGP instabilities. However, given the delicate conditions required
to avoid BGP instabilities [4, 5], the fact that a misbehaving AS has never caused the system to
tip into an unstable state is quite surprising. How, then, can we explain the observed stability of
today’s Internet in the face of common errors and attacks?
This work explains this phenomenon by first noticing that almost every observed attack and
misconfiguration to date [2, 9–12] shares a common characteristic: even when a router announces
egregiously bogus information, it will continue to announce the same bogus information for the
duration of its attack/misconfiguration. We call this class of attacks the “fixed-route attacks”; one
famous and common example of this attack is the “prefix hijack”, where an AS announces an IP
prefix belonging to another AS (e.g., in 2008 Pakistan Telecom claimed to be the legitimate des-
tination for Internet addresses belonging to YouTube, resulting in YouTube-bound traffic reaching
Pakistan Telecom instead [12]).
While it is quite easy to come up with examples where a single fixed-route attack destabilizes
BGP (see Figure 1), our main result is to show that the routing policies used in today’s Internet
prevent such attacks from triggering instabilities.
1.1 Our Model
We now present a brief and intuitive exposition of our model, which is based on the seminal work
of Griffin et al. [5] on BGP stability. See Section 2 for a more thorough explanation. The network
is modeled as an undirected graph G = (V,E), where the set of nodes (vertices) V represents the
ASes, and the set of edges E represents BGP communication links between ASes. The vertex set
V contains a unique destination node d to which all other nodes aim to establish routes.1 The
routing system evolves over an infinite sequence of discrete time steps t = 1, . . . At each time step
t a subset of the nodes is “activated”. Whenever a non-attacker node is activated it executes the
following actions:
1. Process the most recent update messages received from neighboring nodes, where each mes-
sage contains the explicit list of all nodes on the neighbor’s route to the destination.
2. Select the single “best” available route according to a local ranking of all simple (loop-free)
routes to the destination.
3. Announce this route to a subset of the neighboring nodes via update messages according to
a local “export policy”, which determines which routes the node is willing to make available
to each of its neighbors.
Whenever a (fixed-route) attacker node is activated, it announces a fixed route (list of nodes
ending in d) to each of its neighbors. We stress that, apart from the requirement that the attacker
1This is the standard formulation [5]. We use this because BGP establishes routes to every destination IP prefix
independently.
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Figure 1: Node 0 can destabilize this network.
repeatedly send the same BGP route announcement to each neighbor, no restrictions whatsoever
are imposed on the attacker. Thus, the attacker can pretend to be the destination (simply announce
“d”), announce different paths of nodes to different neighbors, not announce any route to some
neighbors, etc.
Our aim is to identify conditions which imply network stability, where by network stability we
mean the guarantee that from some moment forth, every non-attacker node’s chosen route remain
fixed, for every choice of initial state of the system and schedule of node activation and update
message arrivals.2
1.2 Our Results
1.2.1 Even a Single Fixed-Route Attacker Can Destabilize a Network!
Simple examples show that a stable network can easily be rendered unstable even by a single fixed-
route attacker. Consider, for instance, the network described in Figure 1, and assume that each
node’s ranking of routes is as depicted beside it, and that each node has the same route-export
policy—export all routes to all neighbors.
Now, consider this network before node 0 launches an attack. Even though each of nodes 1, 2,
and 3 prefers the longer routes to d via node 0, these routes will not become available as the link
(0, d) does not exist. Thus, each of these nodes will choose the direct route to d, and the network is
stable. Now, suppose node 0 launches a fixed-route attack by announcing the bogus route “0, d” to
all of its neighbors. This network is now an instance of the classic Bad Gadget network [5], which
is notoriously unstable! To understand why, suppose that nodes 1 and 2 think they are routing
along 2, 1, 0, d, while node 3 thinks it uses the route 3, 0, d. This is clearly unstable, since node 1
would rather be using the route 1, 3, 0, d, and so it will change its route selection. By symmetry,
this situation will repeat endlessly. (Of course, each of nodes 1, 2, 3 are actually using a much
longer route through nodes 4 and 5, but because the Internet lacks the infrastructure to validate
the correctness of routes, they have no idea that this is the case.)
2We consider “fair” schedules. Intuitively, a schedule is “fair” if no node is indefinitely starved from acting, or
from receiving update messages from a neighboring node. We stress that update messages in our model can be
arbitrarily delayed and even dropped. Our positive results do not rely on any assumptions on the order of update
message arrivals (e.g., FIFO queueing).
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We identify interesting environments where stability is maintained in the presence of fixed-route
attackers. We also quantify convergence rate in terms of asynchronous rounds [3, 13], i.e., periods
of time in which each node gets at least one update message from each neighbor, and is activated
at least once after receiving these updates.
1.2.2 Shortest-Path Routing is Stable in the Presence of Fixed-Route Attacks
We first consider the simple scenario that all non-attackers have shortest-path rankings of routes,
that is, always prefer shorter routes to longer ones. We present the following, relatively easy to
prove, result, which holds for all choices of export policies:
Theorem 1: When all nodes have shortest-path rankings, convergence to a stable routing state is
guaranteed within |V | asynchronous rounds even in the presence of fixed-route attacks.
We point out that this positive result holds for every network, regardless of the number and
locations of the fixed-route attackers, and of the specific fixed-route attacks launched.
1.2.3 Commercial Routing is Stable in the Presence of Fixed-Route Attacks
We now turn our attention to the commercial routing framework presented by Gao and Rexford [4],
which is believed to capture ASes’ routing policies in practice. ASes sign bilateral long-term
business contracts which determine who provides connectivity to whom. Typically, neighboring
ASes have one of two business relationships: customer-provider, in which one AS (the customer)
purchases connectivity from another AS (the provider), and peering, in which the two ASes agree to
carry transit traffic between their customers for free. These business relationships naturally induce
the following restrictions on ASes’ routing policies, formalized by Gao and Rexford in [4]: These
business relationships naturally induce restrictions on ASes’ routing policies: (1) an AS prefers
revenue-generating routes through customers over routes through its peers and providers; and (2)
an AS only carries traffic from one neighbor to another neighbor if at least one of them pays it,
i.e., is its customer.3
We explore network stability in the context of commercial routing. Our main, surprisingly
strong, result is the following:
Theorem 2: When all nodes have commercial routing policies, convergence to a stable routing
state is guaranteed within 2X + 1 asynchronous rounds even in the presence of fixed-route attacks,
where X is the depth of the customer-provider hierarchy.
Again, this result holds regardless of the number and locations of the fixed-route attackers, and
of the specific fixed-route attacks launched. In today’s Internet, the depth of the customer-provider
hierarchy is very shallow (roughly five levels on average [1]). Hence, commercial routing guarantees
not only network stability, but also fast convergence, even in the presence of fixed route attacks.
In our view, these results explain the observed stability of today’s Internet in the face of common
configuration errors and attacks.
3We also assume that there can be no cycle of customer-provider edges in the AS-level digraph, as an AS cannot
be an indirect customer of itself [4].
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2 Model
2.1 BGP Dynamics in the Presence of Fixed-Route Attacks
Network and routing policies. The network is defined by an AS graph G = (V,E), where V
represents the set of ASes, and E represents BGP communication links between ASes. V consists of
n source-nodes {1, . . . , n}, and a unique destination node d /∈ [n]. (We follow the standard model [5]
where there is a single destination node, because in the Internet routes to every destination IP prefix
are computed independently.) Let SA ⊆ V denote the set of fixed-route attackers.
We think of a route in G from a node i to the destination node d as a sequence of nodes starting
in node i and ending in node d. For every non-attacker source node i ∈ [n] \ SA, let X
i denote the
set containing all possible sequences of nodes in starting in node i and ending in the destination
d, and also the “empty route” ∅. Each non-attacker source node i has a ranking function ≤i,
which defines an order over all sequences of nodes in Xi. Note that i’s preferences over routes in
our model are thus not restricted only to routes which actually exist in the network, but also to
non-existent routes. This is needed to model i’s reaction to bogus routing information propagated
by an attacker. The empty route captures the possibility that i has no route to the destination.
We allow ties in ≤i between two sequences in X
i only if they share the same “next-hop” node, i.e.,
the node that comes after i in both sequences is the same.
In addition, each non-attacker source node i has an export policy, which captures the routes
that i is willing to announce to neighboring nodes. i’s export policy specifies, for every neighboring
node j, a set of routes Eij ⊆ Xi, such that ∅ ∈ Eij , that i is willing to announce to neighbor j.
System dynamics. BGP belongs to an abstract family of routing protocols named path-vector
protocols [5]. Basically, the routing tree to a given destination is built, hop-by-hop, as knowledge
about how to reach that destination propagates through the network. The process is initialized
when d sends an “update message” to announces itself. From this moment forth, each (“well
behaved”) source node establishes a route to d by repeatedly choosing the “best” route announced
to it by its neighbors and announcing this route to its neighbors.
This modeled as follows. The routing system evolves over an infinite sequence of discrete time
steps t = 1 . . .. At each time step t, a subset of the nodes St ⊆ V is “activated”. Whenever a
source node i /∈ SA is activated, it executes the following actions:
1. Process the most recent update messages received from neighboring nodes, where each mes-
sage contains the explicit list of all nodes on the neighbor’s route to the destination.
2. Select the single “best” available route according to the local ranking routes ≤ i.
3. Announce this route to a subset of the neighboring nodes via update messages according to
node i’s export policy.
Whenever an attacker node A ∈ SA is activated, it announces a fixed list of nodes ending in
the destination RAi to each neighboring nodes i via BGP update messages.
Convergence in the presence of fixed-route attackers. We say that the routing system is
convergent if for every initial routing configuration, and for every possible order of node activations
and update message arrivals, then there is a point in time after which the selected route of each
non-attacker source node remains constant. We use the notion of asynchronous rounds to measure
the convergence rate of the system (worst-case across all initial routing configurations and all fair
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schedules). An asynchronous round is a period of time in which each node gets at least one update
message from each neighbor (if there are update messages in transit), and is activated at least once
after receiving all these updates. The first asynchronous round is the shortest period of time in
which this is satisfied. The second asynchronous round is the shortest period of time in which this
is satisfied immediately following the first asynchronous round, etc.
2.2 Routing Systems
2.2.1 Shortest-Path Routing Systems
Source node i has a shortest-path ranking if i always prioritizes shorter routes over longer routes.
We measure route length by the number of nodes on that route. Thus, for every two non-empty
routes Q,R ∈ Xi, if R is shorter than Q, then Q <i R. We make no restrictions on how routes of
equal length are ranked. A shortest-path routing system is a routing system where all source nodes
have shortest-path rankings. No restrictions are imposed on nodes’ export policies in shortest-path
routing systems.
2.2.2 Commercial-Routing Systems
In today’s commercial Internet neighboring ASes typically have one of two common business rela-
tionships: customer-provider and peer-to-peer. These relationships induce a hierarchy, in which no
AS is its own indirect customer (that is, there is no sequence of ASes i1, . . . , ik such that i1 = ik
and every AS is a customer of the AS that comes before it). We now present ranking functions and
export policies that are consistent with the economics of these relationships.
Commercial rankings. Consider a specific source node i. We call a route in Xi a “customer
route” if the first edge on the route is from i to a customer of i. Similarly, we call a route in P i a
“peer route”, or a “provider route”, if the first edge on the route is from i to its peer, or provider,
respectively. Source node i has a commercial ranking [4] if it always prefers customer routes over
peer and provider routes, that is, for every customer route Q and every peer or provider route R it
holds that R <i Q.
Commercial export policies. Source node i has a commercial export policy if it exports peer
or provider routes only to its customers. That is, for every neighboring node j that is a peer or
provider of i, it follows that Eij consists of customer routes only.
3 Shortest-Path Routing Systems
We now present the notion of perceivable routes, which plays a major role in our proofs. We first
introduce the following notation. Consider a route R = (i, . . . , j, . . . , d). We denote the prefix of
route R ending in node j, and the suffix of route R starting in node j, by R|j and R|j, respectively.
We denote the predecessor node and successor node of node j on R by pred(j,R) and succ(j,R),
respectively.
Intuitively a route R ∈ P i is perceivable at node i if there is some imaginable scenario in which
this route is propagated, hop by hop, towards i from either the destination node d or an attacker
node A ∈ SA.
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Definition 1 (perceivable routes). A simple (loop-free) route R = {i, . . . , d} ∈ P i is perceivable
at node i ∈ [n] if one of the two following conditions holds:
1. Route R contains no fixed-route attackers in SA, and R|k ∈ E
k,j for every edge (j, k) ∈ R.
2. Route R contains a single fixed-route attacker A ∈ SA such that (i) E
A,pred(A,R) = R|A; and
(ii) R|k ∈ E
k,j for every edge (j, k) ∈ R|pred(A,R).
Let PRi to be the set of all perceivable routes at node i. We introduce another concept before
proving the main theorem in this section.
Definition 2 (best perceivable routes). The set of best perceivable routes of a non-adversarial
node i, BPRi ⊆ PRi, is the set of i’s perceivable routes that have the highest rank in ≤i.
Recall that ties in ≤i are only allowed between routes that share the same next-hop node. Thus,
the set of best perceivable routes for a node i must all share the same next hop. We call this node
the “best next hop” for i.
Theorem 3.1. Every shortest-path routing system is convergent for every choice of fixed-route
attackers in N . Moreover, convergence to a stable state is guaranteed within n asynchronous rounds.
Proof. Before diving into the proof, we provide the reader with intuition. Our strategy is to design
an iterative algorithm called Fix Shortest Routes (FSR) that fixes nodes to the shortest routes
that are available to those nodes abiding by all aspects of export policies and consistency with
respect to non-adversarial nodes. With every iteration of this algorithm, we fix a single node to a
route as explained above and add that node to a set of I ⊆ V which consists only of nodes who
would immutably announce the same route once they have been added to that set. Note that at
the very beginning of this algorithm, I contains only fixed-route attackers and d.
We first describe FSR. It starts with I containing only SA and d. In FSR, while there is at
least one node i /∈ I such that BPRi is not empty, the following steps are repeated:
1. over all i /∈ I for which PRi 6= ∅, select an arbitrary node i /∈ I with the shortest route in
PRi such that Nxti ∈ I;
2. add i to I;
3. from all nodes’ PR sets, remove all routes that contain i but that violate i’s export policies
with respect to or whose suffix at i is not the route i is fixed to;
4. all nodes with empty PR sets get added to I.
FSR outputs all nodes in I and their stable routes, excluding fixed-route attackers and d.
First notice that FSR fixes every node to a route (possibly the empty route ∅). We prove the
theorem by proving the following lemma:
Lemma 1. For any arbitrary non-adversarial node i who gets fixed to a non-empty route of length
k with FSR, i will stabilize to the same route within k asynchronous rounds from any initial routing
configuration.
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Proof. We prove this lemma by induction.
Induction hypothesis. For any initial routing configuration, for any arbitrary non-adversarial
node, if that node does not stabilize to a route after k asynchronous rounds, then after k asyn-
chronous rounds it will not announce a route of length at most k to any of its neighbors, but if
that node gets fixed to a route of length at most k with FSR, then that node will stabilize to the
same route within k asynchronous rounds.
Base of the induction. Consider an arbitrary routing configuration and suppose that all fixed-
route attackers in SA announce their fixed routes from the start. Suppose that, W.L.O.G., there
is at least one non-attacker node in the routing system whose PR set consists of a route of length
1. For the base case, consider an arbitrary, node i /∈ SA, whose routes in BPR
i are of length 1,
so this node gets fixed to a one-hop route with FSR by construction. During BGP’s execution,
regardless of whether i’s shortest routes contain a fixed-route attacker or not, i must learn of all
such routes within a single asynchronous round (since it is only one-hop away from d or a fixed-
route attacker (running a prefix-hijacking attack), or both). Notice that this is true for any initial
routing configuration because after one asynchronous round all nodes who thought they were one
hop away from d mistakenly, will have realized their misconception and have stopped announcing
one-hop routes to their neighbors, while nodes who mistakenly thought they were farther away
from d than one hop, will have realized that they have direct perceivable routes. This holds for any
activation schedule since all perceivable, one-hop routes will have been revealed to all such nodes
within a single asynchronous round. Thus, after a single asynchronous round, i is guaranteed to
stabilize to its best, shortest route in its PRi, which is exactly what it is fixed to with FSR.
Induction step. Consider an arbitrary node j who gets fixed to a route of length k + 1 with
FSR. j’s next hop on this route must have been fixed to a k-hop route by FSR which, by induction
hypothesis, must be the same route that node converges to within k asynchronous rounds.
Within the (k+1)th asynchronous round, j must receive an announcement from all its neighbors
who have stabilized to their best, shortest routes of length k and who are willing to export their
routes to j. j could also learn of routes from neighbors who do not stabilize to routes within k asyn-
chronous rounds. However, by induction hypothesis, such neighbors would have to be announcing
routes of length greater than k and be fixed to routes longer than k in FSR, so j can ignore these
routes since they are not in BPRj. Note that since step 4 of FSR ensures that nodes get fixed
to routes that are exportable and consistent with respect to the routes that other nodes are being
fixed to and in non-decreasing order of route length, during BGP’s execution j will learn of exactly
the same routes from these neighbors during (k + 1)th asynchronous round as the shortest routes
in PRj when j is being fixed to its route during FSR. Hence, within k + 1 asynchronous rounds,
j will have learned of all shortest routes that could be available to j considering export rules and
route consistency. This must hold for any initial routing configuration because after the (k + 1)th
asynchronous round, all nodes who thought they were k+1 hops away from d mistakenly, will have
realized their misconception and have stopped announcing routes of length at most k + 1 to their
neighbors. This is true because all nodes who have stabilized to k-hop routes will have announced
their routes to all appropriate neighbors by the end of this round while those who have not stabi-
lized to k-hop routes will stop announcing routes of length at most k by induction hypothesis. For
the same reason, nodes who mistakenly thought they were farther away from d than k+1 hops, will
have learned of all their (k+1)-hop perceivable routes . Note that this must hold for any activation
schedule, since all perceivable (k + 1)-hop routes will have been revealed to all such nodes within
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the (k+ 1)th asynchronous round, at which point j is guaranteed to stabilize to its most preferred
route in BPRj via a tie-breaking rule, which is exactly the route it is fixed to with FSR.
The Theorem then follows because no node can have a PR set with shortest routes of length
greater than n.
4 Commercial Internet Routing Systems
Recall that perceivable routes of any node i /∈ SA are the routes that i could ever perceive to exist
if they are propagated, hop by hop, towards i from either d or an attacker A ∈ SA. Also, recall
that ties between perceivable routes of any node i /∈ SA, occur only when the next hop of those
routes is the same, in which case i is allowed to select its most preferred route using an arbitrary
but consistent tie-breaking rule.
Theorem 4.1. Every commercial-routing system is convergent for every choice of fixed-route at-
tackers in SA ⊆ V . Moreover, convergence to a stable state is guaranteed within (2x+1) asyn-
chronous rounds, where x is the height of the customer-provider hierarchy.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmas 4.2-4.7 below.
Before delving into the proof, we provide the reader with an outline as follows. Our strategy is
to design an iterative algorithm called Fix Routes (FR) that fixes nodes to the best routes that
are available to those nodes abiding by all aspects of the commercial routing and consistency with
respect to non-adversarial nodes. With every iteration of this algorithm, we fix a single node to a
route as explained above and add that node to a set of I ⊆ V which consists only of nodes who
would immutably announce the same route once they have been added to that set. Note that at
the very beginning of this algorithm, I contains only fixed-route attackers and d.
FR consists of three subroutines: Fix Customer Routes (FCR), Fix Peer Routes (FPeeR),
and Fix Provider Routes (FPrvR), that FR executes in that order. By adding them one-by-one
to I, FR fixes all nodes with customer, peer and provider routes with FCR, FPeeR and FPrvR
respectively. In Lemma 4.4, we then show that every node in I thus-constructed, in fact stabilizes
to the same route in BGP as the route that node has been fixed to by FR. We conclude with
Lemmas 4.5-4.7, which collectively show that every node converges to that route within 2x + 1
asynchronous rounds.
We now describe FR and its subroutines. FR starts with FCR; at this point I contains SA and
d. In FCR, while there is at least one node i /∈ I such that BPRi contains at least one customer
route, the following steps are repeated:
1. select an arbitrary node i /∈ I such that BPRi contains a customer route;
2. find a node j /∈ I whose most preferred route in BPRj is a customer route and Nxtj ∈ I;
3. add j to I;
4. from all nodes’ PR sets, remove all routes that contain j but whose suffix at j is not what j
is fixed to above;
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5. all nodes with empty PR sets get added to I.
FR outputs all nodes in I and their stable routes, excluding fixed-route attackers and d.
Before proceeding any further, in Lemma 4.2 we show that in step 2 of FCR we are guaranteed
to find a node whose most preferred route in its BPR set contains a customer route only one hop
away from a node in I as long as there is at least one node i /∈ I such that BPRi contains a
customer route.
Lemma 4.2. Consider an arbitrary node i /∈ SA such that BPR
i contains a customer route R.
There exists at least one node j /∈ I whose most preferred route in BPRj is a customer route and
Nxtj ∈ I.
Proof. We consider an arbitrary routing configuration and suppose that all fixed-route attackers
announce their fixed routes from the start. If i is fixed to R, then we are done. Otherwise, R
must not always be available to i, so there must be some node j in R who prefers some other route
R′ to its suffix of R. Consider the closest such node j to i, suppose that R′ is j’s most preferred
route, and note that R′ must be a customer route. If j is fixed to R′, then we are done. If not,
then R′ must not be always available to j, so there must be at least one node k on R′ that prefers
some route R′′ to its suffix of R′. Consider the closest such node k to j, suppose that R′′ is k’s
most preferred route, and note that R′′ must be a customer route. If k is fixed to R′′, then we
are done. Otherwise, R′′ must not be always available to k, so we can find at least one node on
that route whose suffix is not that node’s most preferred route. Since n is finite, we can continue
this argument until we either form a customer-provider cycle or we reach a node whose BPR set
contains a direct customer route to a node in S that it is fixed to. Note that the customer-provider
cycle that we obtain in the former case cannot contain a fixed-route attacker since this cycle was
obtained by repeatedly considering nodes whose most preferred routes were not always available
to them (the routes that fixed-route attackers announce are always available to the neighbors they
are being announced to). Therefore, only the latter case is possible since our routing systems do
not allow for a node to be its own indirect customer.
We now describe FR’s operations during execution of FPeeR. This subroutine starts with I and
the configuration of the routing system the way it is after execution of FCR, i.e. I contains only
fixed-route attackers, d, and nodes with empty and customer routes. In FPeeR, while there is at
least one node i /∈ I such that BPRi contains at least one peer route with the next hop being in
I, the following steps are repeated:
1. select an arbitrary node i /∈ S such that Nxti is in I, and either has a customer route or is d
or a fixed-route attacker;
2. find a node i /∈ I whose most preferred route in BPRi is a peer route and Nxti ∈ I;
3. from all nodes’ PR sets, remove all peer and customer routes that contain i, and remove all
provider routes whose suffix at i is not what i is fixed to above;
4. all nodes with empty PR sets get added to I.
FPeeR outputs all nodes in I and their stable routes, excluding fixed-route attackers, d and all
nodes output by FCR.
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We now describe FR’s operations during execution of FPrvR. This subroutine starts with I
and the configuration of the routing system the way it is after the consecutive execution of FCR
and FPeeR in that order, i.e. S contains fixed-route attackers, d, nodes with empty, customer and
peer routes. In FPrvR, while there is at least one node that is not in I and with a provider route
in its BPR, the following steps are repeated:
1. select an arbitrary node i /∈ S such that BPRi contains a provider route;
2. find a node j /∈ I whose most preferred route in BPRi is a provider route and Nxtj ∈ I;
3. add j to I;
4. from all nodes’ PR sets, remove all peer and customer routes that contain j, and remove all
provider routes whose suffix at j is not what j is fixed to above;
5. all nodes with empty PR sets get added to I.
FPrvR outputs all nodes in I and their stable routes, excluding fixed-route attackers, d and all
nodes output by FCR and FPeeR.
Before proceeding any further, in Lemma 4.3 we show that in step 2 of FPrvR we are guaranteed
to find a node whose most preferred route in its BPR set contains a provider route only one hop
away from a node in I as long as there is at least one node i /∈ I such that BPRi contains a
provider route.
Lemma 4.3. Consider an arbitrary node i /∈ SA such that BPR
i contains a provider route R.
There exists at least one node j /∈ I whose most preferred route in BPRj is a provider route and
Nxtj ∈ I.
Proof. We consider an arbitrary routing configuration and suppose that all fixed-route attackers
announce their fixed routes from the start. If i is fixed to R, then we are done. Otherwise, there
must be at least one node j in R who prefers some other route R′ to its prefix in R. Consider the
closest such node j to i, suppose that R′ is j’s most preferred route, and note that R′ must be a
provider route (otherwise it would have been fixed by now with FCR or FPeeR). We can use the
argument in Lemma 4.2 but consider only provider routes instead of only customer routes until
either a customer-provider cycle is obtained (which would contradict our routing system set up)
or we reach a node whose BPR set contains a direct provider route to a node in I that it is fixed
to.
Lemma 4.4. Every node in a commercial routing system is guaranteed to stabilize to the same
route it gets fixed to in FR, for any activation schedule, for any initial routing configuration.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary node i fixed by FCR subroutine to a customer route. Due to step 4
of FCR, and because FCR fixes nodes to only exportable routes, i must have been fixed to the best
route that could ever be available to i during BGP’s execution for any starting configuration and
any activation schedule.
Now consider an arbitrary node i fixed by FPeeR subroutine to a peer route. After execution of
FCR, nodes considered in FPeeR must have no customer routes in their BPR sets (step 4 of FCR),
otherwise they would have been stabilized in FCR, so their favorite available routes must all be
peer routes. Therefore, due to step 4 of FCR and step 3 of FPeeR, and because FPeeR fixes nodes
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to only exportable routes, i must have been fixed to the best route that could ever be available to
i during BGP’s execution for any starting configuration and any activation schedule.
Finally consider an arbitrary node i fixed by FPrvR subroutine to a provider route. After
execution of FCR and then FPeeR, nodes considered in FPrvR must have neither customer nor
peer routes in their BPR sets (steps 4 and 3 of FCR and FPeeR respectively), otherwise they would
have been stabilized in FCR or FPrvR, so their favorite available routes must all be provider routes.
Thus, due to steps 4 of FCR and FPrvR as well as step 3 of FPeeR, and because FPrvR fixes nodes
to only exportable routes, i must have been fixed to the best route that could ever be available to
i during BGP’s execution for any starting configuration and any activation schedule.
In what follows, we show that during BGP’s execution, all nodes who stabilize to customer,
peer and provider routes, do so within x, x+ 1 and 2x+ 1 asynchronous rounds respectively.
Lemma 4.5. All nodes in the output of FCR, stabilize within x asynchronous rounds during BGP’s
execution.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, every node who gets fixed in FCR to a customer route, converges to the
same route during BGP’s execution. All customer routes that do not contain fixed route attackers,
cannot be greater than x in length. Customer routes that contain fixed-route attackers can be
longer than x, but fixed-route attackers announced their routes in the beginning of the protocol’s
execution. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exists at least one node i who requires
more than x asynchronous rounds to stabilize to a route R. This means that there is at least one
node j who has selected its suffix R|j or who selected some other route that it does not export to
i, only a single round before i stabilized. Otherwise i could have selected R earlier. In either case,
there must exist at least one node k who has selected its suffix R|j|k or who selected some other
route that it does not export to j, only a single round before j stabilized. Otherwise j could have
selected R|j earlier. Since |V | is finite, we can continue this argument until we obtain either (i) a
node whose next hop is in SA ∪ {d}, or (ii) customer-provider cycle containing no attackers. The
latter case would contradict the condition that no node can be its own indirect customer.
Note that all routes considered in this argument are customer routes only and that the choices
that nodes, that are guaranteed to converge to customer routes, make with respect to the routes
that they are guaranteed to converge to are based only on the choices of their customers, whose
choices depend on their customers, and so on. This is so due to nodes’ preferences and export
policies in a commercial routing system. As we follow the argument in this proof to reach case (i)
we notice that for every node who converges to route whose length is more than the number of
asynchronous rounds it took for that node to converge, we can extend a chain of customers that we
have started at node i who took more than x asynchronous rounds to converge. Thus, in case (i)
we could construct a chain of customers that either does not contain an attacker and is longer than
x or does contain an attacker and is longer than x+ y, where y is the length of the route that the
fixed attacker on that route announces. This, however, contradicts the height of the hierarchy of
the routing system, noting that attackers announce their routes at the beginning of the protocol’s
execution.
Lemma 4.6. All nodes in the output of FPeeR, stabilize within x+1 asynchronous rounds during
BGP’s execution.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, every node who gets fixed in FPeeR to a peer route, converges to the same
route during BGP’s execution. All peer routes that do not contain fixed route attackers, cannot be
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greater than x+1 in length. Peer routes that contain fixed-route attackers can be longer than x+1,
but are announced in the beginning of the protocol’s execution. By Lemma 4.5, all nodes found by
FCR must be stable, and therefore are not effected by route announcements after x asynchronous
rounds. Nodes considered in FPeeR must not have customer routes in their BPR sets, otherwise
they would have been stabilized in FCR, so their favorite available routes must all be peer routes.
Since in FPeeR the only nodes added are the ones whose Nxt is in I and either converges to a
customer route, is d or a fixed attacker, thus-added nodes must stabilize within only one more
round than their Nxt.
Lemma 4.7. All nodes in the output of FPrvR, stabilize within 2x+ 1 asynchronous rounds.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, every node who gets fixed in FPrvR to a provider route, converges to the
same route during BGP’s execution. All provider routes that do not contain fixed route attackers,
cannot be greater than 2x+ 1 in length. Provider routes that contain fixed-route attackers can be
longer than 2x + 1, but are announced in the beginning of the protocol’s execution. By Lemmas
4.5 - 4.6, all nodes found by FCR and FPeeR must be stable, and therefore are not effected by
route announcements after x+1 asynchronous rounds. Nodes considered in FPrvR must not have
customer or peer routes in their BPR sets, otherwise they would have been stabilized in FCR or
FPeeR, so their favorite available routes must all be provider routes. For the sake of contradiction,
suppose that there exists at least one node i who requires more than 2x+1 asynchronous rounds to
stabilize to a route R. Note that this means that it must take i more than x asynchronous rounds
to stabilize to a route that contains a node who is d, an attacker, or who stabilized to a peer or
a customer suffix of this route in x + 1 or x asynchronous rounds by Lemmas4.6 and Lemmas4.5
respectively, after that node has converged. We will argue about only the nodes in this node’s
prefix of the route; these are the only nodes who stabilize to provider routes in i’s route.
There must at least one node j who has selected its suffix R|j or who selected some other route
that it does not export to i, only a single round before i stabilized. Otherwise i could have selected
R earlier. In either case, there must exist at least one node k who has selected its suffix R|j|k or
who selected some other route that it does not export to j, only a single round before j stabilized.
Otherwise j could have selected R|j earlier. Since |V | is finite, we can continue this argument until
we obtain either (i) a node whose next hop is in SA∪{d}, or (ii) customer-provider cycle containing
no attackers. The latter case would contradict the condition that no node can be its own indirect
customer.
Note that all routes considered in this argument are provider routes only and that the choices
that nodes, that are guaranteed to converge to provider routes, make with respect to the routes
that they are guaranteed to converge to are based only on the choices of their providers, whose
choices depend on their providers, and so on. This is so due to nodes’ preferences and export
policies in a commercial routing system. As we follow the argument in this proof to reach case (i)
we notice that for every node who converges to route whose length is more than the number of
asynchronous rounds it took for that node to converge, we can extend a chain of providers that
we have started at node i who took more than 2x + 1 asynchronous rounds to converge. Thus,
in case (i) we could construct a chain of providers that either does not contain an attacker and is
longer than x or does contain an attacker and is longer than x + y, where y is the length of the
route that the fixed attacker on that route announces. This, however, contradicts the height of the
hierarchy of the routing system, noting that attackers announce their routes at the beginning of
the protocol’s execution.
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Lemmas 4.5-4.7 conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1 as they show that every node in a given
routing system with a customer-provider hierarchy of height x is guaranteed to converge to the
same route within 2x + 1 asynchronous rounds regardless of the initial routing configuration and
activation schedule.
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